Kant: http://userpages.bright.net/~jclarke/kant/diabook2.html#chp1 - Paralogismos http://semantical.blogspot.com.br/2008/05/notes-on-kants-vocabulary.html - vocabulário Carnap: esquema: http://www.siue.edu/~wlarkin/teaching/PHIL309/carnap.html resumos: 1. Carnap distinguished two kinds of questions that can be asked about what there is. One are the so-called ‘internal questions’, questions like ‘Are there infinitely many prime numbers?’ These questions make sense once a framework that contains talk about numbers has been adopted. Such questions vary in degree of difficulty. Some are very hard, like ‘Are there infinitely many twin prime numbers?’, some are of medium difficulty, like ‘Are there infinitely many prime numbers?’, some are easy like ‘Are there prime numbers?’, and some are completely trivial, like ‘Are there numbers?’. Internal questions are thus questions that can be asked once a framework that allows talk about certain things has been adopted, and general internal questions, like ‘Are there numbers?’ are completely trivial since once the framework of talk about numbers has been adopted the question if there are any is settled within that framework. But since the internal general questions are completely trivial they can't be what the philosophers and metaphysicians are after when they ask the ontological question ‘Are there numbers?’ The philosophers aim to ask a difficult and deep question, not a trivial one. What the philosophers aim to ask, according to Carnap, is not a question internal to the framework, but external to it. They aim to ask whether the framework correctly corresponds to reality, whether or not there really are numbers. However, the words used in the question ‘Are there numbers?’ only have meaning within the framework of talk about numbers, and thus if they are meaningful at all they form an internal question, with a trivial answer. The external questions that the metaphysician tries to ask are meaningless. Ontology, the philosophical discipline that tries to answer hard questions about what there really is is based on a mistake. The question it tries to answer are meaningless questions, and this enterprise should be abandoned. The words ‘Are there numbers?’ thus can be used in two ways: as an internal question, in which case the answer is trivially ‘yes’, but this has nothing to do with metaphysics or ontology, or as an external question, which is the one the philosophers are trying to ask, but which is meaningless. Philosophers should thus not be concerned with (O2), which is a discipline that tries to answer meaningless questions, but with (L1), which is a discipline that, in part, develops frameworks for science to use to formulate and answer real questions. Or so Carnap's project. Carnap's ideas about ontology and meta-ontology are developed in his classic essay (Carnap 1956b). 2. Ontological questions are questions of the form "Are there Fs?"--for example: "Are there universals?", "Are there electrons?", "Are there gods?", etc. Carnap argued that such questions are ambiguous. They may be understood either from within a given conceptual framework, in which case they are to be answered by appeal to the rules of the framework, and typically they will have obvious or trivial answers, or else they may be understood from outside a framework, as asking whether there are "really" any such things, granted that they exist within the framework. Carnap, however, argued that this "external" question is tantamount to asking whether one should adopt the framework in question, and this is a question to which there is no objectively correct answer, though there may be pragmatic considerations for or against such an adoption. For example, take the framework of standard arithmetic. In standard arithmetic it is a theorem that there are prime numbers greater than 1000, from which it follows that there are prime numbers, from which it follows that there are numbers. Thus, the question "Are there numbers?" has an obvious answer if intended internally—obviously, there are numbers in standard arithmetic. On the other hand, if we say, "Yes, but are there really such things as numbers?", we are stepping outside the framework of arithmetic and asking a question about that framework—as Carnap argues, we are asking whether to adopt the framework in question. This is a practical question, a question about what to do, not about the nature of the world. Neither the internal nor the external question can be taken to be a philosophical question about the nature of the world. Hence, if Carnap is right, there are no objective ontological questions for philosophers to investigate, and ontology is an empty discipline. Against this, Quine argued that the internal/external distinction, like the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, is untenable, and thus ontological questions are not ambiguous in Carnap's sense. On the contrary, he held that there is a single meaning to ontological claims, and this is captured by the backwards-E existential quantifier of formal logic. Consequently, to give the answers to ontological questions, one need only translate the relevant theory (whatever the relevant area of human knowledge is) into the notation of standard logic and see whether a sentence of the relevant form is part of the translated theory.